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Civil partnership – respect for private and family life – non-discrimination – sexual 
orientation – gender-neutral marriage – declaration of incompatibility 
Example3Begin 
The fact that heterosexual couples still cannot form civil partnerships after the introduction 
of gender-neutral marriage contravenes Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. Albeit optional under the 
Convention (like adoption, parental leave or child benefits), civil partnership is an institution 
engaging the right to respect for family life and its domestic regulation demands conformity 
with Convention principles, including non-discrimination. This article contrasts states’ wide 
margin of appreciation in matrimonial matters under Article 12 with the limited discretion 
under Article 8 and discusses the strict proportionality test applicable to differences in 
treatment exclusively based on sexual orientation. It dismisses the justifications espoused by 
executive and judicial authorities in recent litigation for the indefinite postponement of 
reform, namely the overestimated costs of legislative amendment, the subordination of the 
equality principle to the number of takers, and attempts to gauge social demand through 
post-2014 statistics on gay partnerships. Finally, it provides arguments for removing 
discrimination by opening civil partnership to opposite-sex couples rather than abolishing it: 
obviating hardship for family units lawfully constituted abroad, ensuring privacy for 
individuals whose disclosure of civil status reveals sexual orientation, and fostering a 
pluralist, tolerant society, accommodating ideological objections to marriage. 
Example3End 
Introduction 
At the time of its adoption, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004) provided same-sex 
couples with the only avenue available to formalise their union in the eyes of the law. After 
the liberalisation of marriage legislation in 2013, the parallel existence of gender-neutral 
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marriage and a civil institution accessible to same-sex couples only has become legally 
untenable. Whilst the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (MSSCA 2013) aimed at 
removing the last remnants of inequality in family law, it paradoxically resulted in a new 
form of discrimination, in that same-sex couples now have a choice between two routes for 
formalising their union, whereas opposite-sex partners only have one; they can either marry 
or forego the protection of the law.  
This article maintains that the situation described is in contravention of Article 8 (right to 
respect for family life) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (the Convention) read in conjunction with Article 14 (non-
discrimination). According to a well-entrenched Strasbourg principle, ‘differences based on 
sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification’.1 This stringent 
test benefits both sets of couples equally and, as discussed below, the objections of the UK’s 
authorities to removing the aforementioned difference in treatment rely on wholly 
unconvincing grounds. Contrary to the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal in 
Steinfeld v Secretary of State for Education,
2
 this paper argues that the UK has an obligation 
to end discriminatory access to civil partnership without delay, even if the introduction of 
civil partnerships was not required under the Convention. In fact, the wide discretion enjoyed 
by Convention states in regulating marriage and deciding whether to offer alternative 
institutions stands in contrast to the close scrutiny of enacted civil partnership legislation. 
Marriage remains a field of domestic regulatory freedom.
3
 The European Court of Human 
Rights (the European Court) has recognised that rules concerning the validity of marriage 
(capacity requirements, celebration formalities) are best left to the determination of each 
state; in fact, ‘Article 12 expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law’.4 
Moreover, since ‘marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ 
largely from one society to another’, the European Court ‘must not rush to substitute its own 
judgment in place of that of the national authorities, who are best placed to assess and 
respond to the needs of society’.5 Predictably, the fact that several states have extended 
marriage to same-sex partners was interpreted as reflecting their own vision of marriage, 
rather than Convention obligations.
6
 Article 12 still ‘enshrines the traditional concept of 
marriage as being between a man and a woman’.7 Moreover, states have no positive 
obligation under Article 8 to legalise civil partnership.
8
 This tenet remains largely unaffected 
by the state-specific finding in Oliari v Italy that Italy’s failure to provide a legal framework 
for same-sex relationships breached Article 8.
9
 The court did not suggest that the Convention 
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law had moved on to require all Council of Europe (CoE) states to legalise same-sex unions; 
instead of an evolving European consensus, the court noted ‘the changing conditions in 
Italy’,10 the ‘repetitive failure of legislators to take account of [Italian] Constitutional Court 
pronouncements’,11 and the fact that ‘there [wa]s amongst the Italian population a popular 
acceptance of homosexual couples, as well as popular support for their recognition and 
protection’.12 The analysis thus focused on the narrow consideration that, in Italy, same-sex 
couples enjoyed a constitutional right to recognition, which Parliament had not secured. The 
violation therefore stemmed from an unconstitutional legislative lacuna rather than a failure 
to comply with a positive obligation under Article 8. Whilst the Oliari judgment might pave 
the way towards a future Convention obligation to provide legal recognition for same-sex 
couples, de lege lata the introduction of civil partnerships remains governed by state 
discretion. 
Conversely, there is a narrow margin of appreciation in the regulation of civil partnerships, 
where available. Not only are permissible restrictions limited to those ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ within the meaning of Article 8(2), but the cultural and religious factors 
justifying discretion in matrimonial matters are absent. The denial of access for different-sex 
couples therefore amounts to ‘treating differently, without an objective and reasonable 
justification, persons in relevantly similar situations’.13 The 2016 ruling of the High Court 
was largely based on a conflation between states’ discretion not to establish institutions akin 
to marriage and an absolute freedom to regulate such institutions when a state chooses to 
introduce them: ‘[t]he denial of a further means of formal recognition which is open to same-
sex couples, does not amount to unlawful state interference with the [heterosexual] claimants’ 
right to family life or private life, any more than the denial of marriage to same-sex couples 
did prior to the enactment of the 2013 Act’.14 Restricted access to civil partnership in a 
jurisdiction offering gender-neutral marriage has never been assessed in Strasbourg, and 
hence municipal courts must consider the whole body of case-law on discrimination and 
Article 8 rights. This article will explore what I view as a more accurate application of that 
jurisprudence.  
The first section rebuts the argument that Article 8 does not apply to the regulation of civil 
partnerships (which, astonishingly, enjoyed some initial success in domestic litigation); it 
also shows that this is not an area of exclusive, or even wide, discretion for domestic 
legislatures. The following section focuses on Convention principles governing prima facie 
discrimination: a narrow margin of appreciation in establishing differences in treatment based 
on suspect grounds, such as sexual orientation, and a strict proportionality test, placing the 
burden on the state to provide cogent justifications, rather than on the individual to 
demonstrate entitlement or detriment. I then consider the two options for remedying the 
discriminatory status quo, namely the repeal of CPA 2004 and the opening of civil 
partnership to opposite-sex couples, providing arguments for the latter. Finally, the last 
section examines the validity of the Government’s ‘wait and see’ justification for deferring 
                                                 
10 Ibid, para [186] (emphasis added). 
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12 Ibid, para [181] (emphasis added).  
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original). 
the adoption of either route to equality,
15
 which disappointingly led to the dismissal of the 
Steinfeld appeal in 2017.  
The ‘attached rights’ rationale and the limits of discretion 
Whilst the issue of a positive obligation to offer heterosexual couples a means of formal 
recognition distinct from marriage was not addressed in Strasbourg litigation, the arguments 
employed in Schalk and Vallianatos to dismiss same-sex couples’ claim to a civil partnership 
(in particular the fact that the Convention is silent on the matter and that there is no European 
consensus) would probably lead to the rejection of heterosexual couples’ analogous claim. 
However, the issue under examination does not concern a claim to a new institution, but 
rather the existence of sufficient reasons justifying selective access to an existing institution. 
According to consolidated Strasbourg jurisprudence, a difference in treatment in the 
enjoyment of a Convention right is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable 
justification, that is if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or the means employed are 
disproportionate to the aim pursued.
16
 The distinction between access to an existing 
institution and claims to a new institution was decisive in Vallianatos: whereas Article 8 did 
not confer a right to form a civil partnership,
17
 the state had an obligation not to exclude 
certain couples from the scope of civil partnership legislation, once introduced, on grounds of 
sexual orientation; since same-sex and heterosexual couples are in a comparable situation as 
regards family life, any difference in treatment would require a compelling justification.
18
 
Vallianatos thus suggests that, absent cogent reasons, the CPA 2004 eligibility system based 
on sexual orientation is not Convention-compliant. 
Although Schalk, Vallianatos and Oliari leave no doubt as to the applicability of Article 8 to 
civil partnership regulation (and hence of Article 14, since a Convention right is engaged), 
the High Court was unconvinced. It oddly equated the proposition that Article 8 did not 
require the introduction of civil partnerships with the conclusion that Article 8 does not apply 
to civil partnership legislation.
19
 It should therefore be recalled, before considering possible 
justifications for the difference in treatment, that the prohibition on discrimination extends to 
a number of rights that are not mandatory under the Convention but are somehow related to a 
Convention area (for example family life). The court has clarified that: ‘Article 14 comes into 
play whenever “the subject-matter of the disadvantage … constitutes one of the modalities of 
the exercise of a right guaranteed”, or the measures complained of are “linked to the exercise 
of a right guaranteed”’.20 The essence of this principle can be traced back to the Belgian 
Linguistic Case, in which the court held that, although Article 2 of Protocol No 1 did not 
grant a right to a particular type of educational establishment (for example a French-speaking 
school), once it was instituted, entry requirements could not be discriminatory; by analogy, a 
state instituting a system of appeal courts goes beyond its Article 6 obligations, however it is 
not permitted to discriminate in granting access to an appeals process.
21
 Melchior helpfully 
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comment (see for example C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Opposite-sex civil partnerships and the ambit of Art 8’ [2016] Fam Law 431). 
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described these as ‘attached rights’:22 neither expressly contemplated in the Convention nor 
implied (necessary for the exercise of express rights),
23
 but connected ratione materiae with 
one of the rights protected, and hence requiring regulation consistent with the general 
Convention philosophy. I am borrowing the ‘attached rights’ label from the academic 
literature insofar as the court has not elaborated any specific terminology to encapsulate 
‘those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any Convention Article, for which 
the State has voluntarily decided to provide’.24 The judicial recognition of a special category 
of rights, non-mandatory under the Convention but somehow ‘attached’ to it, cannot be 
overestimated. Article 14 does not protect a self-standing right to non-discrimination and for 
an application to be admissible it must engage a Convention Article. Bringing further rights 
within the Convention’s ambit expands the scope of Article 14: although applicants invoking 
‘attached rights’ do not claim an entitlement to those rights, they ask not to be discriminated 
against in the regulation of those rights. As Greer explained: ‘Where states decide to provide 
a service which they are not required to do under the Convention … an obligation arises to 
manage it in a Convention-compliant manner, for example, by ensuring that it functions 
without discrimination’.25 
Extensive case-law casts further light on the operation of ‘attached rights’. In EB v France 
the court held that the right to adopt a child, whilst not mandatory under the Convention, 
nevertheless ‘falls within the ambit of Article 8’.26 Another example is the right to parental 
leave, which, according to Petrovic v Austria, comes within the scope of Article 8 insofar as, 
by granting it: ‘States are able to demonstrate their respect for family life’.27 Also, even 
though ‘Article 8 does not impose any positive obligation on states to provide … financial 
assistance’ to parents, ‘this allowance paid by the state is intended to promote family life and 
necessarily affects the way in which the latter is organised as … it enables one of the parents 
to stay at home to look after the children’.28 Another informative precedent is PB and JS v 
Austria: although Article 8 did not guarantee a right to have insurance benefits extended to a 
cohabiting partner, the possibility of doing so under domestic law functioned as a measure 
intended to improve the insured person’s private and family situation, and so the case fell 
under Article 8.
29
  
Adoption, parental leave, child allowance and insurance benefits for family members are all 
discretionary state initiatives, but where a domestic right granting them is created, it falls 
within the material sphere of Article 8. As a result, it cannot be granted on a discriminatory 
basis; eligibility to adopt cannot be restricted on grounds of sexual orientation,
30
 nor can there 
be differences in treatment between servicemen and servicewomen or civilians in respect of 
                                                 
22 See M Melchior, ‘Rights Not Covered by the Convention’, in R St J Macdonald et al (eds), The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp 593–601. 
23 See Golder v United Kingdom (Application No 4451/70) (1979–80) 1 EHRR 524, paras [35]–[36]. 
24 EB v France (Application No 43546/02) [2008] 1 FLR 850, para [48] (emphasis added). See also PB and JS v Austria 
(Application No 18984/02) (2012) 55 EHRR 31, para [32]. 
25 See S Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Council of Europe Publishing, 2000), p 30. 
26 (Application No 43546/02) [2008] 1 FLR 850, para [49]. 
27 (Application No 20458/92) (2001) 33 EHRR 14, para [29]. Although the court found that the difference in treatment was 
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28 Ibid, paras [26]–[27]. 
29 (Application No 18984/02) (2012) 55 EHRR 31, paras [32]–[34].  
30 EB v France (Application No 43546/02) [2008] 1 FLR 850. 
parental leave.
31
 Similarly, treating foreign parents differently with regard to child benefits on 
the basis of their immigration status amounts to discrimination.
32
 These rulings are all the 
more significant since, as Warbrick noted, the court has been traditionally reluctant to 
establish obligations in connection with economic rights, which remain in principle outside 
the sphere of the European Convention.
33
  
The far-reaching potential of ‘attached rights’ is demonstrated by their capacity to bring 
under international supervision measures adopted in largely discretionary areas of Article 8, 
such as immigration rules. In Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom, the court 
thus rejected the allegation that a state did not breach Article 14 ‘by reason of the fact that it 
acted more generously in some respects … than the Convention required’ (in casu, 
facilitating the admission of non-national wives/fiancées of men settled in the country); on 
the contrary, discrimination includes ‘cases where a person or group is treated, without 
proper justification, less favourably than another, even though the more favourable treatment 
is not called for by the Convention’.34  
The approach to European consensus in Petrovic v Austria and Weller v Hungary is also 
noteworthy. The European Court held that ‘the lack of a common standard does not absolve 
those states which adopt family allowance schemes from making such grants without 
discrimination’.35 Therefore the absence of European consensus on an obligation to introduce 
an ‘attached right’ does not detract from the prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of 
that right, where states choose to create it. Furthermore, the consensus analysis is not always 
decisive in discrimination cases; in fact, it did not feature in the court’s ratio decidendi in EB 
v France and Karner v Austria.
36
 Having ascertained in Fretté v France that no consensus 
existed on homosexual adopters and therefore states enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation,
37
 
in EB the court chose not to engage with the respondent’s argument that ‘present-day 
conditions had not sufficiently changed to justify a departure from precedent’ and that ‘there 
was no European consensus on the subject’.38 Similarly, in Karner the court merely took note 
of the third-party interveners’ submission that ‘a growing number of national courts in 
European and other democratic societies required equal treatment of unmarried different-sex 
partners and unmarried same-sex partners’,39 without discussing whether any consensus 
existed on the recognition of same-sex partners as family members for the purposes of 
succession to tenancies.  
All of the above considerations suggest that, from a Convention perspective, civil 
partnerships represent an ‘attached right’: their availability in this jurisdiction is not mandated 
by the Convention, however an institution allowing couples to gain legal recognition and 
                                                 
31 Markin v Russia (Application No 30078/06) (2013) 56 EHRR 8. 
32 Okpisz v Germany (Application No 59140/00) (2005) 42 EHRR 671, para [32]. See also Weller v Hungary (Application 
No 44399/05) (unreported) 31 March 2005, para [34].  
33 See C Warbrick, ‘Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human Rights’, in M Baderin and 
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35 Petrovic v Austria (Application No 20458/92) (2001) 33 EHRR 14, para [34]; Weller v Hungary (Application 
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36 (Application No 43546/02) [2008] 1 FLR 850; (Application No 40016/98) [2003] 2 FLR 623. 
37 (Application No 36515/97) [2003] 2 FLR 9. 
38 (Application No 43546/02) [2008] 1 FLR 850, paras [64]–[65]. The court’s analysis (paras [70]–[98]) makes no reference 
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39 (Application No 40016/98) [2003] 2 FLR 623, para [36]. 
rights constitutes a means through which the state ensures respect for family life, and hence it 
comes under the scope of Article 8. Once the UK has gone beyond Convention requirements 
and created a new right engaging family life, it cannot discriminate in granting access to it. It 
is thus irrelevant, although the Government attempted this argument in Steinfeld,
40
 that the 
UK is not a party to Protocol No 12, which, unlike Article 14, establishes a general 
prohibition of discrimination in respect of any domestic right, not just Convention rights.  
Rather inexplicably, non-discrimination in the enjoyment of ‘attached rights’ was not 
considered by the High Court, which held: ‘there is nothing in Schalk or in Vallianatos to 
support the contention that if a state voluntarily extends an existing form of legal status (here, 
marriage) to couples of a particular sexual orientation, it must be compelled to simultaneously 
extend a different existing form of legal status specifically created for such couples in order 
to give them equal rights, to couples of a different sexual orientation who could always 
marry’.41 However, the applicable case-law is not limited to those two judgments. As briefly 
outlined above, the wider picture of the Strasbourg approach to optional national rights 
concerning family life is that such rights are capable of attracting the application of the 
Convention and hence any difference in treatment requires justification. The Court of Appeal 
has now accepted that the registration of a civil partnership falls under Article 8, either 
because it is ‘a means of, or modality for, promoting family life’,42 following the language of 
Petrovic v Austria, or because ‘a measure concerning the regulation of a same-sex or 
different-sex relationship’ is ‘close to the core values that Article 8 protects; namely “respect 
for family life”’.43 It also dismissed the contention that the ‘fall within the ambit’ test 
includes a demonstration of adverse effect.
44
 A conclusive authority on this point not 
referenced in Steinfeld is EB: ‘The application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose 
the violation of one of the substantive rights protected by the Convention. It is necessary but 
it is also sufficient for the facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or more of the 
Articles of the Convention’.45 This renders the discussion of whether introducing civil 
partnership might correspond to a positive obligation under Article 8
46
 superfluous. The 
wording used by Beatson LJ is perhaps confusing insofar as it speaks about ‘establish[ing] 
that a disadvantage falls “within the ambit” of Article 8’.47 Abdulaziz, surprisingly not cited 
by the appellate judges, indicated that being excluded from a privilege (a ‘more favourable 
treatment’) in a Convention area, rather than suffering a prejudice, also raises an Article 14 
issue. Importantly, however, the Court of Appeal emphasised that it is not necessary to show 
a violation of Article 8 taken alone in order to bring the complaint within the scope of the 
Convention. 
It is thus no longer disputed that Article 8 applies to the regulation of civil partnerships, 
including eligibility bars, and that any difference in treatment in respect of access to this 
institution requires objective and sufficient reasons. Major uncertainties seem to remain as to 
the criteria justifying interferences with this right. It is this area of jurisprudence and its 
application to the civil partnership regime that the next section will examine. 
                                                 
40 [2016] EWHC 128 (Admin), [2016] 4 WLR 41, para [24]. 
41 Ibid, para [54] (emphasis in original). 
42 [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 2 FLR 692, para [25] (per Arden LJ). 
43 Ibid, para [139] (per Beatson LJ). 
44 Ibid, paras [26]–[29], [140]–[145]. 
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46 Steinfeld v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 2 FLR 692, paras [30]–[32]. 
47 Ibid, para [141] (emphasis added). 
The burden of proof in discrimination cases 
Heightened proportionality scrutiny 
It is a well-established Strasbourg principle that ‘[w]here a difference in treatment is based on 
sex or sexual orientation the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow’.48 Moreover, 
‘[d]ifferences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the 
Convention’.49 The European Court has supported this position by reference to, inter alia, soft 
law of the CoE institutions, in particular the collective aim expressed in CoE instruments of 
combating discrimination based on sexual orientation. In an ultra-formalistic reading of the 
case-law, the High Court downplayed the importance of that principle and accepted the 
Government’s submission that the Committee of Ministers Recommendation on measures to 
combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was ‘simply a recommendation’, 
adding that the European Court ‘said nothing specifically to endorse it, let alone to suggest 
that failure to follow it would engage Article 8 either in isolation or read together with 
Article 14’.50 Naturally, the European Court cannot treat CoE soft law as technically binding; 
however, it was acknowledged as persuasive expression of European consensus to combat 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.
51
 This is consistent with the court’s mandate 
to seek indicators of the ‘common heritage’ of Convention parties and their shared 
understanding of what human rights protection requires.
52
 Failure to follow the CoE anti-
discrimination agenda may not automatically lead to a violation of the European Convention, 
but it certainly places an expectation on the respondent state to justify its departure from the 
common position.  
Another fundamental feature of cases involving prima facie discrimination (Karner, 
Vallianatos) is the application of a strict proportionality test, requiring states to demonstrate 
that the different treatment was necessary (that is indispensable, rather than merely adequate 
to support a legitimate aim). Thus, in Karner the court did not accept that in order to promote 
marriage it was necessary to exclude same-sex partners from the law on succession to 
tenancies:  
‘In cases in which the margin of appreciation afforded to States is narrow, as is 
the position where there is a difference in treatment based on sex or sexual 
orientation, the principle of proportionality does not merely require that the 
measure chosen is in principle suited for realising the aim sought. It must also be 
shown that it was necessary in order to achieve that aim to exclude certain 
categories of people … from the scope of application of [the impugned law].’53 
Similarly, in Vallianatos the court was not persuaded that, in order to improve the legal 
position of children born outside marriage, it was necessary to exclude same-sex couples 
                                                 
48 Vallianatos and Others v Greece (Applications Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09) (2014) 59 EHRR 12, para [77]. See also 
Karner v Austria (Application No 40016/98) [2003] 2 FLR 623, para [41]; Kozak v Poland (Application No 13102/02) 
(2010) 51 EHRR 16, para [92]. 
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50 [2016] EWHC 128 (Admin), [2016] 4 WLR 41, para [48]. 
51 In Vallianatos, the CoE recommendation features in the Comparative, European and International Law section 
(paras [29]–[30]) and is implicitly endorsed as evidence of an emerging legal trend (para [91]). 
52 See ECHR Preamble and Article 1(a), CoE Statute. 
53 (Application No 40016/98) [2003] 2 FLR 623, para [41]. 
from the scope of civil partnership law.
54
 In addition, the court noted that out of the 19 CoE 
states having introduced registered unions, only two (Greece and Lithuania) reserved them to 
different-sex couples, and concluded that a consensus was emerging towards gender-neutral 
alternatives to marriage.
55
  
That emerging consensus should weigh considerably in the evaluation of the proportionality 
of the UK civil partnership scheme. As Gaffney-Rhys emphasised: ‘The UK is the only 
contracting state to extend marriage to same-sex couples and to retain the registered 
partnership as a same-sex institution, which may make it difficult to justify under the 
[Convention]’.56 Although the state occupying an isolated position in Europe is not ipso facto 
in breach of the Convention, the existence of consensus greatly narrows the margin of 
appreciation, requiring the respondent to provide particularly weighty justifications; in 
practice, the demonstration of proportionality almost invariably fails.
57
 Consequently, a 
restriction deemed unnecessary by the overwhelming majority of Convention states is hardly 
ever proportionate; this applies to the UK’s singular eligibility bar under CPA 2004.  
Restrictions are even less likely to be proportionate where the institution in dispute was 
recently introduced. This is an important element in discrimination cases: long-standing 
tradition may expand the state’s margin of appreciation in imposing eligibility rules, whereas 
institutions with no historical claims leave less room for discretionary exclusions. For 
instance, in Burghartz v Switzerland, when considering whether the refusal to allow a 
husband to add his wife’s surname to his own had an objective and reasonable justification, 
the court placed weight on the fact that women had not enjoyed the right sought by the 
applicant until recently, and hence no genuine tradition existed.
58
 The absence of a historical 
tradition in the UK for the newly introduced civil partnership stands in contrast to the deeply 
rooted understanding and practice of marriage, and therefore calls for a heightened 
proportionality scrutiny. 
Whilst there is no Strasbourg precedent on this matter, the closest reference is Vallianatos, 
which concerned access to existing civil partnerships, and not Schalk, as the High Court 
suggested,
59
 since the latter case regarded the putative obligation to create civil partnerships 
where none existed. The obligation to open civil partnership to heterosexual couples does not 
stem from a positive obligation to provide them with a ‘further means of formal 
recognition’,60 but from the negative obligation to refrain from barring eligibility to an 
existing institution on a suspect ground such a sexual orientation. The Grand Chamber 
unequivocally established in Vallianatos that a difference in treatment as regards access to 
existing civil partnerships requires compelling reasons.  
By recognising the importance of choice on conscientious grounds for some couples but not 
others, and allowing some couples but not others to manifest their belief by embracing either 
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of the two institutions available, the current regime is also potentially in breach of Article 9 
read together with Article 14.
61
 After the MSSCA 2013, same-sex couples’ beliefs vis-à-vis 
marriage are accommodated, whereas the beliefs of heterosexual couples are ignored. 
Briggs LJ rightly pointed out that, within the group of individuals objecting to marriage, only 
some are allowed to formalise their union through a different institution reflecting their 
beliefs, depending on their sexual orientation.
62
 Whilst this is a particularly problematic 
aspect, Briggs LJ appears unduly dismissive of the double standard as a concern per se, 
accepting it by analogy with a situation where an able-bodied individual can use both the 
ramp and the stairs to access a location, whereas the disabled person can only use the ramp.
63
 
The denial of the dual route to recognition for mixed-sex couples is not based on objective 
impossibility as in Briggs LJ’s example, but on policy choice. A more relevant analogy 
would be between white persons being authorised to use either ramp or stairs, while black 
persons can only use the stairs; there is something intrinsically demeaning and discriminatory 
about a double standard. 
Nor can the alleged marriage/civil partnership equivalence salvage this anomaly. The High 
Court attached unwarranted importance to the finding in Wilkinson v Kitzinger
64
 that the 
symbolic differences between marriage and civil partnership do not result in an interference 
with family or private life where only one institution is available.
65
 Wilkinson v Kitzinger as 
well as the afore-mentioned Parry and Hämäläinen only support the proposition that the 
European Convention does not impose a particular form of legal recognition for committed 
intimate relationships. What these rulings do not legitimise is the existence of a double 
standard, whereby some couples have a further legal option in addition to marriage and others 
do not, depending exclusively on their sexual orientation. 
The relevance of ‘detriment’ for persons treated less favourably 
Admittedly, the position of heterosexual couples requesting access to civil partnership differs 
from that of homosexual couples for whom marriage is not an option. Nevertheless, this 
distinction does not adequately account for the crucial role played for the Government and 
the High Court by the ‘lack of detriment’ for opposite-sex couples unable to form a civil 
partnership.
66
 This is yet another skewed application of Convention principles.  
Firstly, as discussed above, in ‘attached rights’ cases Article 8 was found engaged not 
because of the existence of a detriment, but because the subject matter of the impugned law 
touched upon a Convention right. Indeed, in Vallianatos the existence of great detriment 
(complete absence of legal avenues for the formalisation of same-sex relationships) did not 
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attract the protection of Article 8 taken alone. On the contrary, the court carefully stressed 
that same-sex couples did not enjoy a free-standing right to civil partnerships in a jurisdiction 
where they did not exist; what explained the pro-applicant outcome was the operation of the 
non-discrimination principle.  
Secondly, the Convention test for the legitimacy of differences in treatment has little to do 
with the quantification of detriment. For instance, the law successfully challenged in 
Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany required men (but not women) to pay a small fire service levy 
if they were eligible but unwilling to serve in the local fire brigade.
67
 In Adami v Malta, the 
breach of the Convention arose out of the fact that male citizens were more frequently 
inconvenienced by performing jury duty.
68
 In family name cases (for example Burghartz
69
), 
the only stake is individual preference. None of these cases revolved around the degree of 
detriment. Rather, the starting point in Article 14 cases is whether persons similarly situated 
have been treated less favourably and, where that is the case, the burden of proof is on the 
state to demonstrate why the distinction was justified. The triviality of the detriment cannot 
salvage a measure which cannot be objectively justified. Moreover, even where a certain 
group similarly situated is excluded from a benefit accorded on a voluntary basis rather than 
pursuant to Convention obligations, the state still has the onus of proving that it was 
necessary to exclude those persons from the application of the law;
70
 it is not incumbent on 
the individual applicants to demonstrate a pressing need for them to be included.  
Even if we accept the relevance of detriment in the assessment of proportionality, under 
Article 9 states are expected to refrain from passing moral judgment on a person’s beliefs. 
For those who object to marriage, being compelled to marry in order to enjoy recognition and 
benefits under the law may be a significant detriment; this is a subjective evaluation. 
Moreover, being treated as a citizen with fewer rights and denied a choice in the sensitive 
realm of family life on account of one’s sexual orientation qualifies at least as moral 
detriment. As Gaffney-Rhys pointed out: ‘To deny opposite-sex couples the right to choose 
whether to marry or form a civil partnership when same-sex couples have the ability to do so, 
contravenes human dignity or autonomy’.71 It is therefore startling how marginal the concern 
for equality as a fundamental principle is in both the Government’s approach and the High 
Court’s Steinfeld judgment. The appellate decision moved away from the requirement of 
adverse impact, relying on the intrinsic value of public recognition of the relationship.
72
  
Both courts dedicated more attention than justified to M v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions,
73
 although quite sensibly the Court of Appeal determined that it did not preclude a 
finding that a couple’s recognition is ‘of moment’.74 According to M, a law imposing lower 
child support contributions on non-resident parents living with heterosexual, but not same-
sex, partners fell outside Article 8, because it did not affect the payers’ family life. The 
relevance of M for a Convention appraisal of the current civil partnership regime is marginal. 
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It pre-dates the Strasbourg recognition of same-sex cohabitation as ‘family life’ in Schalk, 
which altered the minimum common standard in Europe, as well as the domestic 
reconsideration of personal status after MSSCA 2013.
75
 Moreover, it was superseded by JM v 
United Kingdom,
76
 where the European Court found no justification for the different 
application of a law which sought to avoid placing an excessive financial burden on the 
absent parent given their new domestic circumstances (whether qualified as ‘family life’ or 
not). A non-resident parent in a same-sex relationship was thus similarly situated to a non-
resident parent in a heterosexual relationship, and the focus of JM on Protocol No 1, Article 1 
rather than Article 8 merely reflects the fact that considerations of status (of the parent’s 
relationship) were subsidiary to the practical issue of financial treatment. M was also taken 
over by PB and JS v Austria,
77
 which confirmed that financial measures aimed at improving a 
person’s private and family situation are caught by Article 8. 
The irony of the egalitarian inspiration of MSSCA 2013 when contrasted with its 
discriminatory consequences has not gone unnoticed.
78
 Before MSSCA 2013, the justification 
for the difference in treatment resided in the function of CPA 2004 as a means for same-sex 
couples to formalise their relationship, given that marriage was reserved to different-sex 
couples. That justification has now entirely lapsed. The Convention affords discretion to 
domestic authorities only in respect of matrimonial law, whereas a recent civil institution, 
incapable of narrow definition based on traditional or religious grounds, needs to be 
accessible to everyone without distinctions concerning sexual orientation, in the pursuit of 
equal dignity and individual autonomy. 
Reform costs, social demand and the all-important principle of 
equality 
Considerations relating to the costs involved in changing the law featured prominently in the 
recent Steinfeld litigation. According to the respondent’s submissions, accepted by the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal, ‘it is a legitimate aim for the government to avoid the 
unnecessary expenditure of large amounts of taxpayers’ money as well as the disruption and 
potential waste of time and effort that could be caused by immediate legislative change’.79 
This argument is problematic on several grounds. 
Firstly, the allegation of high costs does not appear substantiated. The Government depicted 
the change in the law as a colossal enterprise of ‘amending numerous provisions of statutes 
and rules to allow heterosexual couples to register civil partnerships’ ‘only to find … that 
there is virtually no demand for civil partnerships’.80 The sole major change needed is the 
omission of the reference to sex in section 3(1)(a) CPA; desirable amendments would include 
the modification of section 2(1) of the Children Act 1989 so as to allow male civil partners in 
heterosexual unions to automatically acquire parental responsibility for biological children
81
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and the inclusion of male civil partners in section 35 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 so as to recognise their parenthood in relation to children born to the 
couple through assisted reproduction with donor gametes.
82
 Reform may also reconsider the 
few deliberate distinctions between civil partnership and heterosexual marriage reflecting 
biological differences, namely the omission of non-consummation as a ground for annulment 
and of adultery as a basis for dissolution.
83
 With the adoption of CPA 2004, virtually all 
legislative areas were modified to equalise the position of civil partners and spouses; by 
amending the eligibility criteria in section 3 CPA, all other statutory provisions will be 
automatically aligned, in the same way that removing the gender requirement for a valid 
marriage in section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 has expanded the scope of 
numerous statutes, which now apply to ‘spouses’ of either sex. The purported costs therefore 
appear grossly overestimated and certainly insufficient to justify the preference for protracted 
discrimination.  
Secondly, official statistics and empirical research suggest that social demand does exist for 
the introduction of opposite-sex civil partnerships. Scherpe pointed out that the 2014 report 
on the Civil Partnership Review consultation published by the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport indicated that 20 percent of the unmarried heterosexual respondents to the 
consultation would rather form a civil partnership than marry, and hence ‘there is a need’.84 
Gaffney-Rhys further observed that empirical studies regarding the attitudes of cohabitants 
towards marriage reveal that some couples who reject marriage on ideological grounds would 
enter a civil partnership if this option were available.
85
  
Thirdly, concerns over numbers cannot outweigh the importance of upholding a fundamental 
principle. Regrettably, the proposition that the costs would only be justified by a high demand 
for civil partnerships was accepted by both High Court and Court of Appeal. According to 
Beatson LJ, a waiting period before contemplating reform is appropriate in order to 
‘determine how many people would continue to enter into civil partnerships or want to do so 
because they share the appellants’ sincere objections to marriage’.86 Quite why legislative 
reform is primarily predicated on the number of persons benefitting from it (or, seen from the 
reverse perspective, on the number of potential victims if reform is not effected) is not 
explained in the judgment. Scherpe convincingly argued: ‘The fact that this might be a rather 
small number of people cannot, in itself, serve as an acceptable argument when the issue at 
stake is one of equality and non-discrimination. The number of “takers” and thus “market 
considerations” simply do not apply in this context’.87 If numbers could justify legislative 
inaction, transsexual persons’ rights may well have been overlooked; apparently, in 2004, 
when the Gender Recognition Act was adopted, there were only approximately 2,000 
transsexuals in the UK.
88
 As the dissenters emphasised in Hatton v United Kingdom, rejecting 
an argument that individuals sensitive to aircraft noise pollution were too small a section of 
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the community for their detriment to count, ‘one of the important functions of human rights 
protection is to protect “small minorities” whose “subjective element” makes them different 
from the majority’.89 The balancing exercise should compare the impact on persons affected 
by a measure, numerous or otherwise, with the benefit to the community; thus, the prejudice 
of being discriminated against in the enjoyment of family life and freedom of belief weighs 
heavier than questionable savings for the public purse.  
Finally, equality of treatment should be an overriding objective in a democracy based on 
respect for fundamental rights, and concerns over the time spent to remove discriminatory 
laws are inadequate. Unfortunately, the discourse of equality as a superior social good does 
not play an important part in the Court of Appeal decision allowing discrimination to 
continue on an indefinite (albeit purportedly provisional) basis. The swift abolition of 
discrimination is not merely, or even primarily, a pragmatic goal. 
Removing discrimination: the two ways forward 
Two options are available to rectify the current discriminatory scheme: amending CPA 2004 
to allow heterosexual couples to register a civil partnership or repealing the Act, while 
continuing to recognise extant civil partnerships until the natural disappearance of all such 
relationships as a result of dissolution, conversion to marriage, or death.
90
 The Government’s 
2014 consultation on the Future of Civil Partnerships included a third option: the immediate 
abolition of civil partnership. I will not treat it separately insofar as the phasing-out and the 
immediate abolition essentially amount to one option, that is the elimination of this institution 
(whether abruptly or following a transitional stage). The abrupt abolition of civil partnerships 
is unlikely; requiring existing civil partners to convert their partnership into a marriage or 
have the relationship written off would be a highly controversial interference with their 
family life. As regards the two main options, arguments for opening civil partnership to 
different-sex couples rather than abolishing it appear more compelling. 
A more tolerant approach to family law and extended legal protection 
Maintaining civil partnerships and opening the institution to all couples would offer an 
opportunity for individuals who have ideological objections to marriage to formalise their 
relationship, achieve social recognition and greater legal protection. In a democratic society 
characterised by ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’,91 the majority’s attachment to 
marriage should not preclude the acceptance of an alternative institution, especially after it 
has already been made available, unless there are good reasons to eliminate it.  
The claimants in Steinfeld, who wished to formalise their de facto union before the birth of 
their child, were self-professed feminists and rejected what they considered to be the 
‘patriarchal’ connotations of marriage.92 They argued that without access to civil partnership 
‘they would be forced to enter into marriage against their conscience in order to obtain the 
legal protections and privileges to which they aspire, and the formal recognition of their 
relationship …’.93 Many feminists depict marriage as a ‘state-approved contract historically 
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implicated in the oppression of women and LGBT people’94 and an ‘institution symbolizing 
male supremacy and female subordination’.95 As Gaffney-Rhys noted, numerous 
stakeholders, both in the heterosexual and gay communities, view marriage as having 
‘religious and patriarchal overtones’ and a certain ‘attached baggage of prevailing societal 
norms and expectations’, whereas civil partnership is perceived as a ‘more modern, 
egalitarian alternative’.96 The availability of civil marriage for atheist couples, whereby the 
ceremony is stripped of religious trappings, does not remove all those historical associations 
and therefore does not obviate the need for reform. As Kitzinger and Wilkinson pointed out, 
‘the symbolism of marriage, rather than its features as a civil institution, is key both to lesbian 
and gay couples’ forced exclusion from it, and to some activists’ refusal to accept or demand 
it’.97 Whether one shares those views or not, a dismissive attitude towards the objection that 
some couples have to marriage is inconsistent with a pluralist society and respect for 
individual autonomy. 
To revert to a system offering a single form of legal union would also be to ignore the 
extensive social and legal debate on whether marriage and civil partnership are equivalent. 
The enactment of MSSCA demonstrates that for the legislator the two institutions are 
different and ought to co-exist, otherwise ‘marriage in all but name’98 would have sufficed. It 
must have been ascertained by domestic decision-makers in the lead up to MSSCA 2013 that 
having access to one institution but not the other is inconsistent with full equality, and this 
conclusion should also be applied to resolve heterosexual couples’ claim to gender-neutral 
civil partnerships favourably.
99
 Nor can it be said that gay marriage was deemed necessary on 
account of the religious connotations previously reserved to marriage, indeed MSSCA did not 
introduce religious marriage for same-sex couples, but a mere opt-in for religious 
organisations willing to celebrate such marriages, largely analogous to what had already been 
achieved for civil partnerships with the Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved 
Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011 (with the important caveat that the Church of 
England may not opt in). This shows that non-religious marriage and civil partnership are not 
seen as perfectly equivalent. The fact that CPA was not repealed in 2013 further indicates that 
civil partnership was not considered purposeless once marriage was liberalised. It would be 
illogical to claim that, for heterosexual couples, civil partnership would be redundant, whilst 
the imperfect equivalence marriage/civil partnership has been accepted in relation to same-
sex couples. According to Wintemute, the failure to simultaneously liberalise marriage and 
repeal or reform civil partnership was actually explained by ‘political expediency’, that is the 
Government’s attempt to combine the retention of civil partnerships demanded by Stonewall 
(the NGO promoting LGBT equality) with the preservation of marriage as the sole option for 
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heterosexual couples, favoured by the Church of England.
100
 Whether or not this legislative 
choice had a political rather than principled rationale, the Government can no longer invoke 
the marriage/civil partnership equivalence to harness reform once it has acted in a manner 
that negates that equivalence.  
Moreover, the availability of an alternative to marriage would extend the protection of the 
law to more family units. One objection to opening civil partnership to opposite-sex couples 
was that it would weaken the institution of marriage – a concern notably voiced by former 
Prime Minister David Cameron.
101
 An increase in the number of couples willing to formalise 
their relationship one way or another would nevertheless ensure greater stability for families, 
thereby benefitting children and society as a whole. Unsurprisingly, in Vallianatos the 
European Court approved of the new civil partnership law’s aim of strengthening the legal 
status of children born to unmarried parents.
102
 Given the precarious nature of cohabitees’ 
rights, it is desirable for British authorities to provide for a ‘third way’, by opening the civil 
partnership option to opposite-sex couples. Some of the respondents to the 2014 consultation 
suggested that heterosexual civil partnerships would ‘result in greater instability within 
families, by offering a parallel institution that provides all the legal rights and privileges of 
marriage without the need for lifelong commitment’.103 This objection is without foundation: 
not only is marriage not indissoluble either, but civil partnership cannot be unilaterally ended 
‘on demand’, in fact the same grounds and bars govern divorce and dissolution of civil 
partnership; moreover, entering a civil partnership presupposes not only rights, but also the 
same (potentially lifelong) obligations as marriage.  
Recognition of foreign civil partnerships: avoiding hardship for 
families formed abroad 
Removing the current bar would implicitly put an end to the hardship arising for foreign 
opposite-sex civil partners living in the UK from the operation of private international law 
rules. In fact, section 216(1) CPA makes the same-sex requirement a pre-condition for legal 
recognition in this country. The Act offers thus no protection for heterosexual civil 
unions/registered partnerships lawfully entered into abroad. This results in the discriminatory 
treatment, on grounds of sexual orientation, of certain civil partnerships lawfully constituted 
overseas. For instance, in France the civil union regime is gender-neutral; however, same-sex 
partners relocating to the UK receive legal recognition, whereas heterosexual partners are 
treated by the law as strangers.
104
 Practical consequences for foreign resident couples further 
include the inability to dissolve a partnership formed abroad in an English court in order to 
reacquire the capacity to marry.
105
  
Admittedly, as Crown noted, because the obligations assumed under civil partnership 
schemes vary across the world, foreign civil partners should not necessarily receive automatic 
recognition as civil partners in this jurisdiction, but rather be given the option to gain this 
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status.
106
 However, any reservations to the automatic recognition of foreign heterosexual civil 
partners should also apply to foreign same-sex civil partners. Moreover, marriage itself does 
not generate identical consequences in all states, yet marriages validly celebrated abroad are 
not required to pass further hurdles in order to be recognised in the UK. The greater 
scepticism towards civil partnerships and the departure from the lex loci celebrationis 
principle cannot be adequately justified. 
If, to remove the inequality between same-sex and heterosexual couples, the authorities were 
to abolish civil partnership, foreign civil partners of either sexual orientation would remain 
without legal protection. Closer to home, heterosexual couples registering a civil partnership 
in the Isle of Man, where this option was introduced in July 2016, would not receive legal 
recognition in the rest of the UK. It is questionable whether Manx same-sex civil partnerships 
formed after the repeal of CPA 2004 would continue to be recognised in the UK. The 
rationale for the recognition of foreign civil partners was to afford committed couples legal 
protection, and that should continue to be a valid objective of a cosmopolitan society. In a 
world characterised by the increased acceptance of civil partnerships and high international 
mobility, the legislation should aim to recognise all family units lawfully constituted in their 
country of origin (save for public order objections, for example child marriage). From this 
perspective, the repeal of CPA would be an anti-progressive and non-inclusive measure.  
Naturally, foreign civil partners have the option of entering a marriage when relocating to the 
UK, but this is not an entirely satisfactory solution. Firstly, the option is not immediately 
available; the parties must wait for at least 28 days after giving notice of intention to marry to 
the register office, which in turn requires at least seven days of residence. They would 
therefore be treated as strangers by the law for a certain period of time; it is worth recalling 
that in Marckx v Belgium the brief gap in legal protection between the child’s birth and the 
mother’s act of formal recognition was considered problematic.107 Secondly, in cases of 
temporary relocation, for example for study purposes or a fixed-term work contract, it seems 
excessive to expect foreign couples to marry and thereby dissolve their civil partnership in 
the eyes of their law of nationality. Thirdly, the marriage solution diminishes the parties’ 
autonomy in choosing between different institutions available in their home country in a 
manner inconsistent with the aims of private international law: to ‘minimize the problems of 
cross-border interactions’ and ‘integrate [unknown phenomena] into the domestic system’ by 
comparing foreign institutions to functionally similar institutions in the law of the forum.
108
  
Societal support for the liberalisation of civil partnership legislation 
Available data indicate sufficient societal support for legal reform. Sixty-one percent of the 
228,000 responses to the 2012 Equal Civil Marriage Consultation disagreed with the 
proposition that civil partnerships should not be made available to opposite-sex couples.
109
 Of 
the 24 percent opposing the change, it was suggested some were driven by the conviction that 
same-sex marriage should not be open to same-sex couples, and hence the status quo 
                                                 
106 See B Crown, ‘Civil Partnership in the UK – Some International Problems’ (2004) 48(4) New York Law School Law 
Review 697, pp 708–710. 
107 (Application No 6833/74) (1979–80) 2 EHRR 330. 
108 See SL Gössl and J Verhellen, ‘Marriages and Other Unions in Private International Law – Separate but Equal?’ (2017) 
31 IJLFP 174, p 182. 
109 See Steinfeld v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 (Admin), [2016] 4 WLR 41, paras [12]–[15]. The 
second consultation in 2014 received a fraction of the initial consultation’s responses, with only 10,634 addressing the 
question of whether civil partnerships should be opened to mixed-sex couples. See statistics at paras [16]–[19].  
(heterosexual marriage and gay civil partnerships) should be maintained.
110
 The 
Government’s rebuttal to public opinion arguments in Steinfeld cannot but inspire perplexity:  
‘Civil partnerships were created to allow equivalent access to rights, 
responsibilities and protections for same-sex couples as those afforded by 
marriage. They were not intended or designed as an alternative to marriage. 
Therefore the government did not believe that they should now be seen as an 
alternative to marriage for opposite sex couples, who have access to 
marriage …’111  
The purpose of introducing civil partnerships then (when marriage was not accessible to gay 
couples) does not explain its rationale now as a further institution selectively accessible, nor 
does it explain why an alternative to heterosexual marriage would be detrimental or 
unnecessary. 
Civil status, sexual orientation and privacy issues 
Considerations of legal certainty and legitimate expectations suggest that, if CPA is repealed, 
existing civil partnerships, whether entered into in the UK or recognised here as validly 
formed abroad, would continue to produce legal effects. As a result, for a significant period 
of time the status of (gay) civil partner and that of spouse (of either sex) would continue to 
exist in parallel. Scholars have already criticised the obligation for civil partners to impliedly 
disclose their sexual orientation when indicating marital status on documents, which raises 
privacy concerns.
112
 While marital status no longer reveals information on a person’s sexual 
orientation, civil partner status does, and would continue to do so after a hypothetical CPA 
repeal. Conversely, opening civil partnership to opposite-sex couples would completely 
dissociate any information regarding civil status from the involuntary disclosure of sexual 
orientation.  
Recognition of marriage and civil partnership as institutions of equal 
worth 
Making civil partnership available to all couples regardless of their sexual orientation would 
remove any lingering perception of civil partnership as an inferior institution.
113
 In its current 
form, this institution carries connotations of ‘otherness’, inherited from its original function 
as a remedy for a minority problem. A gender-neutral formula would instead elevate civil 
partnership to the position of mainstream institution, a community-wide alternative to 
marriage. One of the concerns expressed in the 2014 consultation was, in fact, that a repeal of 
the CPA would signal that ‘civil partnerships were never truly recognised … and that they 
would become of a lesser recognised status’.114 
Cumulatively, the above arguments suggest that a more rights-protective, tolerant and 
inclusive solution to end discrimination is upwards equalisation, by opening civil partnership 
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to opposite-sex couples, rather than precluding the formation of further civil partnerships. 
Unfortunately, none of these considerations, nor indeed policy arguments in favour of 
downwards equalisation through the repeal of CPA, were reflected in the Steinfeld debate.  
Deferring choice: the ‘wait and see’ policy 
Waiting for what? The demerits of temporisation 
Unlike the High Court, the Court of Appeal held that heterosexual couples’ ability to marry 
does not mitigate the different access to civil partnerships and the status quo cannot be 
indefinitely maintained. However, both courts accepted that reform may be legitimately 
deferred to allow the authorities to evaluate the impact of opening marriage to gay couples.
115
 
There are at least two major flaws in this approach. 
First, whatever empirical evidence becomes available after a period of observation (in 
particular statistics as to how many gay couples choose civil partnership over marriage), it is 
unable to determine how many heterosexual couples would benefit from the liberalisation of 
civil partnership or to predict consequences on heterosexual marriage and cohabitation. 
Measures intrinsically incapable of achieving the legitimate aims pursued, such as an 
inconclusive waiting period, are bound to fail the Article 8(2) test; to remain proportionate, 
an interference must be suited for meeting its objective.
116
 A period of reflection cannot 
provide answers on the wider social demand for civil partnerships; in the short term, for gay 
couples marriage, a right secured after a lengthy campaign for equal recognition, may be a 
choice dictated by egalitarian sentiments. For heterosexual couples, the choice of marriage is 
likely to be prompted by entirely different motives. Moreover, no real balancing can be 
performed between the individual interest of heterosexual couples objecting to marriage and 
society at large if research does not include all stakeholders’ views on civil partnerships.  
Secondly, any such waiting period would require a time limit for the restriction to remain 
proportionate, otherwise the existence of section 15 MSSCA requiring the future of CPA ‘to 
be reviewed’ would be deprived of all effet utile. Disappointingly, the High Court’s ruling 
suggested that postponing sine die is not inconsistent with the Convention. The Court of 
Appeal’s decision also accepted that postponing without a clear timeframe does not breach 
the Convention. For Briggs LJ, requiring the executive to provide a detailed plan would be 
‘micromanaging’.117 Central to the other appellate judges’ analyses is the presence of a Bill 
before Parliament.
118
 The treatment of reform as a foregone conclusion appears, however, 
over-optimistic. The fact that the same Private Member’s Bill, previously unsuccessful,119 
was before Parliament again did not corroborate the cabinet’s commitment to change (indeed 
the submissions before the High Court and the waiting policy invoked before the Court of 
Appeal suggested otherwise), nor did it guarantee parliamentary support. The question before 
the courts was whether the current civil partnership regime is lawful, and the mere 
consideration of reform cannot make lawful a measure that is not so otherwise. It is 
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regrettable that the judiciary should condone procrastination when fundamental values such 
as equality are at stake. The acknowledgement by the Court of Appeal that the scheme is 
unlawful would have represented a momentous step towards reform, urging the executive and 
legislative authorities to take effective action. Instead, the Court of Appeal’s ruling 
encourages further stalling by accepting as necessary and sufficient the Government’s vague 
reassurances that the matter is being kept under review. 
Thirdly, the entire ‘wait and see’ policy hinges on the need to avoid unnecessary costs. 
Arden LJ, delivering the minority judgment, makes the important point that both the repeal 
and the amendment of CPA involve costs and therefore the only legitimate concern is over 
‘resources unnecessarily incurred if there is a change in the law which has to be reversed’.120 
However, even the argument of deferring reform for fear that it may have to be reversed in 
the future should be cautiously considered when it comes to core human rights. If such an 
argument had any validity, it should follow that civil partnerships should have never been 
introduced in 2004 since only nine years later gay marriage achieved full equality; public 
money could have been saved while waiting for wider acceptance of same-sex marriage 
rather than proceeding to extraordinary legislative changes in order to accommodate a new 
institution which, as it turns out, only filled a gap for a few years. Briggs LJ spoke about the 
‘transitional purpose’ of CPA 2004, but ironically, and somewhat inconsistently, he referred 
to the ‘practical impossibility’ of an interim measure to remedy discrimination against 
heterosexual couples (impossible insofar as it may have to later be abolished).
121
 Just like 
same-sex civil partnerships, a transitional solution such as opening civil partnership to 
heterosexual couples, subject to subsequent re-evaluation, is preferable to perpetuating 
discrimination. It should also be noted that, unlike the introduction of civil partnerships in 
2004, which, as discussed above, did not respond to Convention obligations, the change of 
the status quo is needed to put an end to a Convention violation. If we repudiate the idea that 
CPA was a waste of public money, because the principle of equality is more important than 
public expenditure, then a waiting policy before removing discrimination against 
heterosexual couples should be firmly rejected. Moreover, as Arden LJ suggested, a limited 
use of civil partnership in the future would not necessarily require repealing the Act.
122
 An 
underused institution/ piece of legislation in no way hinders the functioning of the legal 
system and hence does not require formal removal. This observation completely nullifies the 
rationale of a waiting policy. In addition, there is actually a greater risk of unnecessary 
expenditure if civil partnerships are firstly abolished in light of a few years’ statistics and 
subsequently reintroduced as a result of increased social demand (including from 
heterosexual couples, an aspect currently not investigated by the Government). Allowing 
legal reform now is the less hazardous option, and more consistent with the view that the law-
making process should not rein in social experimentation. It is impossible to reach a future-
proof decision, given the continuous evolution of social ideas and perceptions, and therefore 
the costs argument should be much more marginal than it was made to be in litigation so far. 
The focus should be on substantive public policy questions.
123
 The excessive concern over 
the number of takers would seem to amount to a mere strategy of temporising and diverting 
attention from the more significant social issues underlying a gender-neutral alternative to 
marriage.  
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Regrettably, even Arden LJ was not prepared to make a declaration of incompatibility in 
respect of section 3(1) CPA, on the basis that Parliament must be afforded an opportunity to 
consider reform.
124
 Courts should not refrain from a declaration of incompatibility merely 
because ‘Parliament will be informed of th[e] court’s judgments’.125 Were it sufficient to 
informally advise Parliament of the highest courts’ views on Convention-incompatibility, a 
declaration would always be superfluous, and section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 would 
have no raison d’être; this cannot have been Parliament’s intention when enacting the statute. 
Moreover, courts’ confidence that a declaration of incompatibility is unnecessary once 
Parliament becomes aware of a legal challenge has already proven misplaced. Several 
Supreme Court justices in Nicklinson, a 2014 judgment regarding the blanket ban on assisted 
dying, deemed a declaration of incompatibility inappropriate before Parliament had an 
opportunity to reconsider matters in light of those proceedings;
126
 over three years later, the 
only progress made by the Assisted Dying Bill is the formality of the first reading in the 
House of Lords. By contrast, faced with the same questions in Carter in 2015, the Canadian 
Supreme Court found a violation of several constitutional rights,
127
 which prompted the 
legalisation of medically assisted dying in June 2016. The successful outcome of Oliari in 
Strasbourg was also owed to the Italian Constitutional Court’s unambiguous support for the 
right asserted by the claimants (legal recognition of same-sex unions), in the form of a 
decision of unconstitutionality. This speaks to the importance of the judiciary in promoting 
rights, rather than giving the executive and legislative authorities carte blanche on policy 
decisions and a mild slap on the wrist instead of a formal pronouncement on constitutionality 
issues. British courts’ refusal to issue a section 4 declaration in the presence of an ongoing 
situation of discrimination on the mere assumption that Parliament, informed of the 
judgment, will act upon it, is an abdication from a fundamental constitutional role expressly 
bestowed on them by the Human Rights Act.
128
  
Lessons from European practices and legal cross-fertilisation 
Instead of waiting for evidence which in respect of heterosexual couples will never arrive 
from surveying gay couples’ post-MSSCA preferences, the UK could more usefully take 
stock of the experience of civil partnership elsewhere in Europe. The comparativist method, 
aimed at ‘constitutional borrowing’ or ‘cross-fertilisation’,129 may thus fill in the 
observational gap in the UK by drawing inspiration from best practices elsewhere. Registered 
partnerships first became available in the Nordic countries as an alternative to marriage for 
same-sex couples, in Denmark (1989), Norway (1993), Sweden (1994), Iceland (1996) and 
Finland (2001).
130
 Subsequently, in Norway, Sweden and Iceland, the statutes introducing 
registered partnerships were repealed after the adoption of gender-neutral marriage (in 2008, 
                                                 
124 Ibid, paras [111]–[114]. 
125 Ibid, para [131]. 
126 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice; R (AM) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 657, 
para [116]. 
127 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
128 See C Draghici, ‘The Blanket Ban on Assisted Suicide: Between Moral Paternalism and Utilitarian Justice’ (2015) 3 
European Human Rights Law Review 285, pp 294–297. 
129 See C Dupré, ‘Globalisation and Judicial Reasoning: Building Blocks for a Method of Interpretation’, in A Halpin and 
V Roeben (eds), Theorising the Global Legal Order (Hart, 2009), p 107.  
130 See I Lund-Andersen, ‘The Nordic Countries: Same Direction – Different Speeds’ in K Boele-Woelki and A Fuchs (eds), 
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe. National, Cross-border and European Perspectives (Intersentia, 
2012), pp 4–5. 
2009 and 2010, respectively), although existing partnerships remained valid where partners 
chose not to convert them into marriage.
131
 Other countries followed suit: after deciding to 
open marriage to gay couples (in 2012, 2015 and 2016, respectively), Denmark, Ireland and 
Finland have repealed civil partnership legislation and currently offer only one option for 
public recognition (marriage) regardless of sexual orientation.
132
 Registered partnerships 
exclusively for the recognition of same-sex cohabitants are typical in countries where 
marriage is a heterosexual institution, for instance in Germany (available since 2001), 
Switzerland (2005), Austria (2010),
133
 as well as in Eastern Europe, in the Czech Republic 
(2006), Slovenia (2006) and Hungary (2009).
134
 In the aftermath of Strasbourg judgments, 
Italy joined this trend (2016) and Greece opened civil partnerships to same-sex couples 
(2015). A number of jurisdictions opted from the outset for gender-neutral non-marital 
unions; the Netherlands thus introduced registered partnerships in 1998 and maintained that 
scheme after the extension of the eligibility to marry to same-sex couples in 2001.
135
 Before 
and after same-sex marriage was legalised in Spain at national level (2005), numerous 
Autonomous Communities enacted legislation allowing stable couples to register their union 
regardless of their sexual orientation: Catalonia (1998), Aragon (1999), Navarra (2000), 
Balearic Islands (2001), Valencia (2001), Basque Country (2003), Galicia (2006) etc.
136
 
Belgium, France and Luxembourg also offer both marriage and registered domestic 
partnerships to all couples.
137
 What this overview indicates is that virtually all other 
jurisdictions in which a regulatory framework for non-marital unions exists either offer it as 
an alternative to marriage for all couples, or as a parallel route to recognition for same-sex 
couples ineligible to marry. It also suggests that there is ongoing social demand in Europe for 
a different form of public recognition for stable relationships.
138
 
Countries where this institution exists constitute the correct comparator against which the 
reasonableness of our civil partnership scheme ought to be measured, rather than the 47 CoE 
member states; in fact, what is in dispute is not an alleged obligation to offer mixed-sex civil 
partnerships. The High Court’s observation that ‘only 8 of the 43 [sic] member states of the 
Council of Europe have some form of civil union for opposite sex couples’139 is therefore 
largely irrelevant. The pertinent question is not how many states have introduced civil 
partnerships for heterosexual partners, but how many other states in which marriage is 
gender-neutral reserve civil partnerships for same-sex couples; the answer is none. As 
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Scherpe noted: ‘In those jurisdictions where the registered partnership was designed to be the 
functional equivalent of marriage for same-sex couples, the opening up of marriage for same-
sex couples meant that the functional equivalent had outlived its usefulness’.140 Alternatively, 
the two institutions may coexist side by side, responding to different social outlooks and 
philosophical convictions.  
Concluding remarks 
By enacting the CPA 2004, the UK went beyond Convention requirements. Thus, ironically, 
the law governing the formalisation of intimate relationships in England and Wales did not 
offend the Convention prior to the enactment of MSSCA 2013, which purported to further, 
rather than lessen, the protection of fundamental rights. Nonetheless, presently the combined 
effect of CPA and MSSCA is to treat couples differently as regards the choices available to 
formalise their relationships, exclusively on grounds of sexual orientation. Leaving the civil 
partnership regime unaltered, instead of either repealing CPA 2004 or removing gender 
restrictions, would amount to a violation of Article 8 (and arguably Article 9) read in 
conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.  
European human rights law continues to uphold the understanding of marriage as a 
heterosexual union, and the departure in several jurisdictions from the traditional paradigm is 
based on discretionary family legislation rather than Convention entitlements. Conversely, 
Strasbourg case-law shows that if a state elects to introduce civil partnerships, restricting 
access on grounds of sexual orientation requires cogent justification. The European Court has 
not yet pronounced on the legitimacy of gay-only civil partnerships in a country where 
marriage is accessible to all couples; however, there is sufficient clarity from the whole body 
of Strasbourg case-law to guide domestic authorities in their assessment of Convention-
conformity. Following Strasbourg jurisprudence, as mandated by section 2 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, does not simply mean seeking a like-for-like precedent, but also applying 
well-established principles to new legislative dilemmas.  
From that perspective, the case-law suggests that the current regulation of civil partnerships is 
not defensible. Unlike marriage eligibility under Article 12 (a provision characterised by 
textual deference to domestic laws and historical reasons for conservative interpretation), 
access to the new civil partnerships, governed by Article 8, is not an area in which states 
enjoy wide discretion. The UK was not required to offer civil partnerships, but once it 
introduced this right, ‘attached’ to ‘respect for family life’, a preferential treatment based on 
sexual orientation in the stipulation of eligibility criteria is a prima facie violation of Article 8 
read together with Article 14. Where a different form of legal union is available, Vallianatos 
uncontrovertibly established that it cannot be accessible on discriminatory grounds. Further, 
the difference in treatment based on a protected characteristic such as sexual orientation 
requires very serious justifications, and the state has the burden of proving the strict necessity 
of the restriction. In light of the justifications seen in the Steinfeld proceedings, it is submitted 
that the civil partnership scheme fails to meet that high threshold of necessity. Indeed, no 
other CoE state in which marriage is gender-neutral has found such a restriction necessary. 
Concerns over the cost of amending the law or the number of couples whom the revised law 
would benefit cannot outweigh the fundamental interest in removing discrimination. Nor can 
they legitimate temporisation.  
After decades of struggling to establish that same-sex partners are similarly situated in 
respect of family life entitlements when compared to opposite-sex couples, British society is 
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now faced with a paradoxical need to reassert that proposition in order to claim no lesser 
rights for opposite-sex couples. Admittedly, the availability of marriage makes the legal 
position of heterosexual couples less critical; however, the force of the principle of non-
discrimination leading to the liberalisation of family law should be the same. Moreover, the 
importance of freedom of conscience and belief should not be under-recognised. Extending 
civil partnerships to opposite-sex couples rather than repealing the CPA 2004 would be more 
consistent with the equal dignity and autonomy of all individuals, in an open-minded, 
pluralist democracy. It would also position the UK as a tolerant cosmopolitan society, which 
extends protection to different family units lawfully constituted overseas.  
There is no compelling reason to preserve equal marriage and unequal civil partnership for a 
further period of time. A gender-barred civil partnership scheme in a country embracing 
marriage equality is a legal aberration that has outlived its initial purpose and ought to be 
amended without delay. The carte blanche given by the Court of Appeal to the executive and 
legislative authorities as to the timing of reform, motivated by costs-related concerns, does 
not reflect the importance of non-discrimination in respect of family life and freedom of 
belief. One would hope that future litigation in the Supreme Court
141
 will bring about a 
declaration of incompatibility in relation to section 3 CPA, urging Parliament to reconsider a 
bizarre and backwards-looking case of discrimination. 
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